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Abstract 
 
There is now widespread recognition that, far from being politically apathetic, young 
people across Europe are engaged in a wide range of ‘political’ activities. While 
turnout at national and European elections among the 18-25 age group may be low, 
researchers have highlighted diverse and creative new forms of political participation.  
In relation to young women, in particular, Harris (2005) has presented a compelling 
analysis of the new ‘borderspaces’ opened up between public and private domains by 
young women through the use of new technologies. She contends that in the face of 
greater surveillance and regulation brought about by the shift to neo-liberal forms of 
governmentality, carving out a protected space for oneself is a political act, in itself. 
Moreover, the creative ways in which young women across the world use such spaces 
– to question dominant narratives about the nature of contemporary girlhood, to resist 
discourses which construct young women as merely passive consumers, and to trouble 
conventional notions of ‘youth participation’ – are highly political. Some EU 
representatives have indicated an awareness of these new forms of engagement and 
professed a desire to develop links between them and more traditional forms of party 
politics and policy making (Hoskins, 2005). Nevertheless, the degree to which these 
sentiments have been translated into policy remains unclear. This article draws on 
recent documents on young people, citizenship and political participation to assess the 
extent to which these new spaces of young women’s politics are, firstly, recognised 
and, secondly, valued within EU policy. 
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Young People and Political Participation:  
an analysis of European Union policies 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is now widespread recognition that, far from being politically apathetic, young 
people across Europe are engaged in a wide range of ‘political’ activities. While 
turnout at national and European elections among the 18-25 age group may be low, 
researchers have highlighted diverse and creative new forms of political participation.  
Moreover, a number of writers (Harris, 2005; Aapola et al., 2004) have argued that 
some of the most innovative new forms of political engagement have been developed 
by young women who, in response to the restrictions of a highly regulated, neo-liberal 
society, have used new technologies to carve our protected political spaces for 
themselves. These have then been used in creative ways to question dominant 
discourses about young femininity and also about the ‘political apathy’ of the young.  
 
Some European Union (EU) representatives have indicated an awareness of these new 
types of engagement and professed a desire to develop links between them and more 
traditional forms of party politics and policy making (Hoskins, 2005). Nevertheless, 
the degree to which these sentiments have been translated into policy remains unclear. 
This paper draws on recent EU policy documents on young people, citizenship and 
political participation to assess the extent to which these new spaces of young 
women’s politics are, firstly, recognised and, secondly, valued within EU policy. 
First, however, to provide some context for these debates, it discusses the ways in 
which young women’s lives have come to be understood in contemporary society. In 
doing so, it emphasises some similarities between the polarised nature of discourses 
about both girlhood and young people’s political participation. 
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Girlhood and political engagement 
 
Understandings of contemporary girlhood 
 
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of ‘girl studies’ as a discrete field of 
academic interest, offering a new and multi-disciplinary perspective on the lives of 
young women today (see, for example: Harris, 2004; Walkerdine et al., 2001). A 
central theme within this growing body of work is the contrasting, and often 
conflicting, ways in which girlhood is constructed in contemporary society. In their 
discussion of representations of the ‘new’ girl of the twenty-first century, Aapola and 
colleagues identify two key discourses. The first they term ‘Girl Power’. Within this 
discourse the emphasis is very much on a feminist ideal: ‘a new, robust, young 
woman with agency and a strong sense of self’ (2005: 39). This, they argue, is 
enticing to many girls as it offers them a positive image of young femininity that 
stresses the wide variety of options and high degree of autonomy open to them in 
carving out their future. Nevertheless, while the type of girlhood constructed by this 
discourse is largely upbeat and optimistic, it is not without its problems.  Indeed, 
Aapola et al. note that as a result of its ‘can do’ orientation, the concept of ‘Girl 
Power’ obscures the structural constraints that continue to affect young women’s 
lives. Thus, by failing to recognise the ways in which characteristics such as gender, 
ethnicity, class and sexuality can still strongly influence the choices young people 
make, it tends to affirm neo-liberal processes of individualization.  
 
The second discourse, which Aapola et al. term ‘Reviving Ophelia’, constructs a 
different understanding. Here, it is the vulnerability of girls and the potential dangers 
they face growing up that is emphasised. Aapola et al. take their name for this 
discourse from the 1994 publication by the American therapist and academic Mary 
Pipher, entitled ‘Reviving Ophelia: Saving the Selves of Adolescent Girls’. They 
argue that this book is emblematic of a much wider belief within contemporary 
society that many girls have suffered a crisis of self-esteem ‘as a consequence of a 
girl-hostile culture that denies them expression of their authentic selves in 
adolescence’ (2005: 45). This, they contend, becomes manifest through problems 
such as eating disorders, depression and high-risk behaviours. In assessing the impact 
of this particular understanding of contemporary girlhood, Aapola et al. suggest that it 
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has brought some important benefits, through its emphasis on the difficulties and 
barriers young women continue to face within society. Nevertheless, they go on to 
argue that the discourse is also deeply problematic in its individualization of social 
problems and the solutions it tends to promote – namely that girls need to take 
responsibility for themselves, for example, through seeking therapy and other forms 
of support, or working through their problems alone.  In this way, it tends to sideline 
the structural causes of problems. In contrast, Aapola et al. contend that low self-
esteem and many associated issues are a result of the ways in which young women 
internalise (and individualize) the structural inequalities that continue to characterise 
late modern society, and which they encounter ‘because they are female in a world 
that was never designed for women’ (2005: 55).  They go on to conclude that while 
the ‘Girl Power’ and ‘Reviving Ophelia’ discourses of contemporary girlhood may 
appear contradictory, they are both grounded within an individualized understanding 
of society in which young women’s subjectivities are seen as projects that can be 
shaped by the individual (2005: 54). 
 
Young people’s political engagement 
 
These conflicting discourses about the nature of contemporary girlhood are reflected 
to some extent in similarly polarised debates about young people’s political 
engagement, played out through the media, policy documents and academic texts. 
Loader (2007) distinguishes between a pessimistic ‘disaffected citizen’ perspective 
and a more upbeat ‘cultural displacement’ discourse.  The former emphasises young 
people’s mistrust of politicians, disenchantment with political institutions, political 
apathy and more general disengagement from the public sphere, and suggests that 
these trends are likely to lead to the weakening of democratic citizenship. In contrast, 
the cultural displacement perspective is predicated upon the assumption that ‘young 
people are not necessarily any less interested in politics than previous generations but 
rather that traditional political activity no longer appears appropriate to address the 
concerns associated with contemporary youth culture’ (2007: 1-2). In this analysis, 
collective forms of political action are seen to have been replaced by more fluid and 
individualized forms of engagement and expression. This binary has much in common 
with Bennett’s (2007) comparison between ‘dutiful citizens’ and their ‘self-
actualising’ counterparts. ‘Dutiful citizens’ are, in his typology, those associated with 
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traditional politics: they typically join civil society organisations and/or political 
parties, believe that voting is the core democratic act and feel an obligation to 
participate in government activities.  However, it is the ‘actualising citizen’ who, 
Bennett argues, better represents many young people today: he or she is motivated by 
a sense of individual purpose rather than obligation to government, perceives voting 
as less meaningful than other political acts, and favours loose networks of community 
action (often facilitated by new technologies).  
 
In assessing the extent to which these ideal types map onto the available empirical 
data about young people’s political activities, there is certainly strong and well-
documented evidence that young people are not as engaged as other age groups with 
formal politics – at least as measured through participation in national elections 
(Buckingham, 2000; Adsett, 2003). In his analysis of voting in the UK’s general 
election in 2005, for example, Phelps (2005) shows how reported turnout amongst the 
18-24 age group was 44.3 per cent, compared with 71.3 per cent for the 35-44 age 
group and 86.1 per cent amongst those aged 65 or more. It is also clear from Phelps’ 
data that turnout has fallen significantly amongst this age group over recent decades. 
Indeed, the figure for 2005 (44.3 per cent) can be contrasted with the 75.4 per cent 
reported turnout for the same age group in 1992 and the 88.6 per cent reported in 
1964. While some of this decline can be attributed to a ‘period effect’ (i.e. something 
that depressed turnout among all age groups between 1992-2001), it is possible that 
we may also be seeing a generational shift. Indeed, Phelps argues that those young 
people in the 18-24 age group in 2005 have been subject to a unique array of political 
influences, many of which have been negative. These include growing up in a highly 
individualized and marketised society in which not voting is less likely to be seen as a 
serious neglect of civic duty, and coming of voting age ‘in a period characterised by 
weak leadership, policy incompetence, sleaze and scandal’ (2005: 486). 
 
To test some of these and other speculative hypotheses about the reasons for young 
people’s apparent disengagement with formal politics, Henn et al. (2005) conducted a 
nationwide survey of more than 700 ‘attainers’ – young people eligible to vote in an 
election for the first time. Their data suggest that young people do profess an interest 
in formal politics, and are committed to the idea of elections and the democratic 
process more generally. Nevertheless, respondents indicated that they had been 
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alienated from formal politics, as presently practised in the UK, by their perception 
that they had little or no influence on political affairs as well as their negative view of 
political parties and professional politicians. Henn and colleagues conclude that 
evidence such as this ‘indicates that young people in Britain are sufficiently interested 
in political affairs to dispel the myth that their apparent disconnection from formal 
politics is as a consequence of their general apathy’ (2005: 573). While Henn et al. 
demonstrate convincingly that young people’s disinclination to vote is not explained 
well by claims of apathy, they do nevertheless employ a rather narrow definition of 
politics (focussing largely on the formal and institutional), which sheds little light on 
how young people themselves understand the term.   
 
O’Toole et al. (2003) suggests that, in relation to young people in particular, it can be 
helpful to adopt a bottom-up approach, one which does not impose definitions of what 
is or is not political upon respondents but, instead, engages with their own 
understandings. Moreover, they also argue that it is erroneous to see apathy and 
participation as a simple dichotomy. Indeed, they contend that non-participation in 
formal politics can itself be a conscious choice, and thus a means of political 
engagement. Research that has employed broader understandings of ‘the political’ has 
typically found evidence of much higher levels of engagement amongst young people. 
Indeed, studies of voluntary activity conducted by young men and women has 
emphasised its political nature (Roker et al, 1999; Brooks, 2007). Furthermore, 
Vromen’s research on the ‘participatory citizenship’ of young Australians highlighted 
the high degree of political engagement evident among her respondents.  She notes 
that while a large majority of the 18-34 year-olds in her study had taken part in the 
most individualized and least institutionalised of the ‘participatory acts’ they were 
asked about (such as donating, volunteering and boycotting), ‘as acts became more 
institutionalised (contacting officials) or more collectively oriented (rallies), the 
proportion of the sample who have ever participated in these acts drops to less than a 
quarter’ (2003: 85).  Moreover, Lash and Urry (1994) have suggested that far from 
being apathetic, young people are at the forefront of developing new social 
movements and global forms of activism – facilitated in large part by new forms of 
technology. 
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Gender differences in political engagement 
 
Gender has tended to be overlooked in many analyses of young people’s political 
participation. Indeed, Aapola et al. maintain that ‘unquestioned assumptions about 
youth apathy are often redoubled in the case of young women’ (2005: 188). 
Nevertheless, some of the more recent studies that have employed a broader 
conceptualisation of political engagement have paid greater attention to gender as 
well as various other social characteristics. Vromen (2003) argues that, amongst her 
respondents, young women were more likely than their male counterparts to take part 
in activities that she labels  ‘activist’ (such as attending a rally or march, boycotting 
products and joining campaigning organisations) and/or ‘communitarian’ (for 
example, volunteering, joining a youth club or church group and contacting an MP). 
They also had a significantly higher average number of total ‘participatory acts’ than 
men.  In their research with a younger age group (14 year-olds) in America, Hooghe 
and Stolle (2004) found high levels of anticipated political participation – with girls 
mentioning more political activities in which they intended to engage than boys. 
Again, there were some differences in the type of anticipated activity, with girls more 
inclined than boys to favour social movement-related activities and less likely to be 
attracted to more radical and confrontational forms of political engagement.   
 
While several writers have commented upon the potential for new technologies to 
open up new forms of political engagement amongst the young (Bennett, 2007; 
Livingstone et al., 2005), Harris has presented a compelling analysis of the innovative 
ways in which many young women are already exploiting such media. In particular, 
she highlights the new ‘borderspaces’ opened up between public and private domains 
by young women through the use of the internet and other new technologies. For 
example, the internet offers a space for young women to talk without having to 
disclose their name, address or other personal details. This, she claims, is a state of 
‘simultaneous presence and absence’ which ‘works well for young women seeking to 
combine a desire to organise and communicate with others with a need to avoid 
surveillance and appropriation of their cultures and politics’ (2004: 161). It thus 
allows them ‘greater potential for political efficacy than is achieved in a purely public 
space, but with less risk than is afforded by more traditional and regulated public 
sites’ (ibid.).  These borderspaces offer young women safe spaces to discuss sensitive 
9 
 
topics (such as same-sex attraction) and to create narratives that bring into question 
dominant representations of young women. More specifically, it is claimed that such 
spaces: 
 
Foster girls’ public self-expression, often understood as the ability to tell 
private stories (secrets) which are otherwise prohibited or repressed by the 
dominant culture..... Thus publicised, such narratives often become the stuff of 
political commitment and an affirmation of girls’ legitimacy within the realm 
of the political. (Gottlieb and Wald quoted in Harris, 2004:164) 
 
Harris (2004) contends that in the face of greater surveillance and regulation of young 
people – and young women, in particular – brought about by the shift to neo-liberal 
forms of governmentality, carving out a protected space for oneself is a political act, 
in itself.  Furthermore, the creative ways in which young women across the world use 
such spaces – to question dominant narratives about the nature of contemporary 
girlhood, to resist discourses which construct young women as merely passive 
consumers, and to trouble conventional notions of ‘youth participation’ – are highly 
political. Thus, these more recent studies of the extent and nature of young people’s 
political engagement have provided strong evidence that young women are both 
interested in political issues and willing to take action for political ends – even if this 
is not always recognised by politicians, policymakers and social commentators. As 
such, they provide an important contrast to some studies of older adults, which have 
suggested that women are less interested in politics than men, and participate less in 
political life (Atkeson and Rapoport, 2003; Carroll, 2003). They also highlight the 
contribution of young women, in particular, to the development of innovative new 
ways of political expression, and thus offer little support for the ‘disaffected citizen’ 
perspective. 
 
Young people and the European Union 
 
The concern about alleged political apathy and young people’s apparent reluctance to 
participate in formal politics is not unique to the UK. Researchers in Australia, 
Canada and many parts of Europe have pointed to similar trends (Bessant, 2004; 
Kloep and Hendry, 1997).  There are, however, some national differences in the 
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theses put forward to explain these patterns. For example, in relation to eastern 
Germany, in particular, Oswald and Schmid (1998) have argued that the 
disengagement with formal politics evident amongst young people can be linked to 
their wider disillusionment with democracy as a result of their experiences since 
reunification.  In contrast, in Norway, the decline in youth employment during the 
1990s has been argued by some to account for an increasing disinterest in formal 
politics (Carle, 2000).   
 
Nevertheless, if one adopts a broader conceptualisation of politics and political 
engagement, as discussed above, then a different picture emerges (Pleyers, 2005). For 
example, in Germany, Nolan has shown how various youth subcultures – including 
the rave scene – work politically ‘against the mechanisms of ...[formal] civil power 
that would define and control youth culture’ (2001: 309).  Moreover, the Young 
Europeans Survey (Flash Eurobarometer, 2007) highlights interesting differences 
across the continent in the types of political activity pursued by young people. For 
example, while voting in elections was highest in Belgium (where it is compulsory), 
Sweden and Italy and lowest in Latvia, the UK and Portugal, taking part in 
demonstrations was most common in southern Europe and Germany, while trade 
union membership was more prevalent amongst the young people of Scandinavia, the 
UK, Ireland and the Netherlands.  
 
The literature suggests that there may be comparable differences in the extent to 
which young people across Europe have taken on a distinctly ‘European’ political 
identity. Lutz et al.’s (2006) analysis of Eurobarometer data suggests that young 
Europeans are more likely than older groups to consider themselves to have a 
European identity alongside their national one. For example, in 2004, almost 70 per 
cent of the 20-24 age group claimed to have a ‘multiple’ political identity, compared 
to only just over 50 per cent of those between the age of 75-79. They argue that their 
analysis points to a definite cohort effect, and suggests that current younger 
generations within Europe have been socialised in such a way that they are likely to 
maintain their multiple identities throughout their lives. Indeed, they predict that by 
2030, within the 33-40 age group, those who identify as European in some way will 
outnumber those who do not by three to one. However, Lutz et al.’s work also 
highlights significant variation between countries in the prevalence of reported 
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‘multiple identities’. For example, according to their data, between 1996 and 2004, an 
average of 78 per cent of respondents from Luxembourg reported multiple identities, 
compared with 54 per cent of Danish respondents and only 40 per cent of those from 
the UK. Qualitative research has tended to point to similar disparities. In comparing 
the attitudes towards and knowledge of Europe held by young people in Germany and 
the UK, Faas (2007) contends that the considerable differences he found can be 
explained by differences in the wider political climate of the two nations, and the 
extent to which European issues are included within the school curriculum. In 
contrast, Grundy and Jamieson (2007) suggest that education (the curriculum itself 
and the degree to which foreign languages are promoted and/or taken up) has a 
relatively small part to play in explaining national differences. Instead, they argue that 
it is the extent to which young people are provided with opportunities to develop 
friendships and share meaningful experiences with other EU nationals that is key. 
Their comparative analysis also presents a more complex understanding of European 
political identity than that offered by the Eurobarometer data discussed by Lutz et al. 
While they point to the growth in identification with Europe, they also argue that most 
young people across Europe have stronger feelings for their local region and/or their 
nation than they have for Europe. They also sound a note of caution in how 
commitment to a European political identity should be understood: 
 
Those who identify themselves as European were not necessarily more 
tolerant of cultural, national and ethnic diversity. It clearly cannot be assumed 
that fostering European identity will necessarily also foster a tolerant, caring 
Europe, and not a racist or chauvinistic ‘fortress’ Europe. (Jamieson and 
Grundy, 2005: 131) 
 
As many analyses of EU policy over decades has shown, young people have often 
been a central focus of measures to inculcate a European identity.  These have 
included various educational initiatives, such as the ERASMUS scheme, founded in 
1987, to encourage university students to spend a year of their studies at an institution 
in another European country (see, for example, King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003). Recent 
EU youth policies have also put forward a range of measures to promote a European 
identity – alongside other initiatives that focus on young people’s political 
12 
 
engagement more generally. These are now considered in more detail and provide the 
focus for the following sections of this paper. 
 
EU policy and young people’s political engagement 
 
To date it is unclear how EU policies that hope to promote political participation and 
active citizenship articulate with the new forms of engagement – predicated upon  
broader conceptualisation of politics – that have been documented within the 
academic literature and discussed above. Some EU officials have certainly suggested 
that more needs to be done to engage with the types of non-formal politics favoured 
by the young (Hoskins, 2005) but it cannot be assumed that these intentions have 
automatically been translated into practice. The article now considers a number of 
recent publications from the European Union on youth to explore the extent to which 
EU policymakers have attempted to engage with the new forms of political 
engagement favoured by, for example,  the ‘actualising citizen’ and young women 
who are carving out ‘borderspaces’ for themselves (see Annex 1 for further details).  
All address youth policy, in a broad sense, but most include a specific focus on 
measures to further the political participation of young people and/or develop their 
identity as a ‘citizen’. These are:  
 
• ‘A New Impetus for European Youth’ (CEC, 2001), published in 2001. This 
White Paper, written by the European Commission and drawing on a large-
scale consultation across Europe, offers strong encouragement to young 
people to become involved in public life, and in the design and 
implementation of public policies. It also urges member states to co-operate in 
the framing of their youth policies. 
 
• Resolutions of the Council of Ministers (in 2002 and 2005), which followed 
the 2001 White Paper. They established a ‘Framework for European Co-
operation in the Field of Youth’ (EC, 2002). This comprises three main 
strands, one of which is the promotion of ‘active citizenship’ among young 
people, through the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)i.  
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• The ‘European Youth Pact’ (EC, 2005), published by the European Council in 
2005 as part of the revised Lisbon Strategy. This aims to improve the 
education, training and social inclusion of young people, while reconciling 
family and working life. 
 
• The ‘Youth in Action Programme 2007-2013’ (EC, 2006), published in 2006. 
One of the central aims of this programme is to heighten young people’s 
awareness that they are European citizens, and to encourage them to 
participate more fully in discussions about the future of the European project.  
 
These documents were analysed thematically – in terms of: the ways in which ‘young 
people’ are understood; the recognition given to current forms of political 
participation amongst the young; the policies proposed for engaging young people 
more fully; and the extent to which gender is addressed. The remainder of this paper 
considers some of the key themes that emerge from analysis of these five documents 
in light of some of the claims within the academic literature discussed in the earlier 
part of the article.  
 
i. The notable absence of gender 
 
As noted above, the White Paper, ‘A New Impetus for European Youth’, drew on a 
large-scale consultation exercise with young people across Europe, and the annex to 
this document presents a summary of their views on relevant topics. This states 
clearly that many of the young people who were consulted believed that gender issues 
needed more attention within EU policy (2001: 49). Nevertheless, it is notable that, 
with the exception of a discussion of measures to reconcile family and work 
commitments and of workplace discrimination, gender is absent from all five policy 
documents. It is briefly mentioned as one of many variables that can lead to the 
polarisation of opportunities for young people (2001: 47), but this analysis is not 
developed in any sustained manner, and no consideration is given to ways in which 
‘difference’ in gender (or indeed in relation to other social characteristics) may be 
addressed by policy. 
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This reluctance to engage with the differences between young men and young 
women’s lives overlooks the large body of research that has documented the various 
ways in which gender continues to have a significant impact on the life chances, 
opportunities and experiences of young people across Europe (e.g. Brannen and 
Nilsen, 2002; du Bois Reymond, 1998). Furthermore, many of the specific policy 
recommendations advanced by the various documents fail to engage with some of the 
gender-related issues raised by the academic literature. For example, the White Paper 
tells us that:  
 
It is on the ground, where young people can see the results of their personal 
commitment, that active citizenship becomes a reality....It is by throwing 
themselves into social activities which are open to all, without any form of 
discrimination, that young people can make their contribution to a more 
solidarity-conscious society and live citizenship to the full. (2001: 5) 
 
It seems naive, at the very least, to assume that all social activities are open to young 
people ‘without any form of discrimination’. As discussed above, recent research has 
outlined significant differences by gender in the ways in which young men and young 
women engage with the political, and the types of issues they pursue. Moreover, 
studies from the UK have also shown how young men tend to dominate activities that 
are deemed (by some teachers and young people at least) to be more ‘prestigious’ and 
influential such as school and youth councils and students unions (Brooks, 2006; 
Roker et al., 1999). Indeed, in their analysis of the models of citizenship that underpin 
much youth work in the UK, Hall and Coffey argue that while none of the activities 
with which the young people were engaged were inevitably gendered,  
 
In practice the distinctions were clearly demarcated. Some of this segregation 
was intended, the result of an explicitly gendered organisation of space and 
activity on the part of youth work staff looking to make room for emergent, 
gendered identities and groupings. More often, however, space occupied and 
activities engaged in ‘just ended up’, and not altogether unsurprisingly, 
structured in this way. (2007: 287) 
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They thus conclude that while such settings aim to make open and democratic space 
for young people, ‘they remain pronouncedly gendered settings, in ways that 
necessarily cross-cut the citizenship agenda’ (ibid.) 
 
ii. Deficit model assumed 
 
As discussed earlier in this paper, recent scholarship on young people and political 
engagement has tended to emphasise the important ways in which they are politically 
active, even if this is not in relation to formal politics or conducted through 
conventional means of participation. The White Paper does, in places, acknowledge 
this reframing of the debate, and recognise the new ways in which young men and 
women are engaging with the political: for example, it reports that many young 
people ‘regard the view that they are disinterested or uncommitted as groundless and 
unjust’ (2001: 24), suggesting that policymakers may be sympathetic to the cultural 
displacement discourse outlined by Loader. However, this analysis is not consistent 
throughout the document. Indeed, in many places a very different understanding is 
proffered, and a deficit model is often assumed.  For example, it argues that if the 
European project is to progress, it needs ‘commitment on the part of young people to 
the values on which it is based’ (2001: 7), implying that, at present, such commitment 
is lacking. Similarly, in the Youth in Action document, the programme’s aim to 
‘inspire a sense of European citizenship among the youth of Europe’ appears to be 
underpinned by a clear assumption that they currently lack this citizenship.  
 
This view is also implicit in the suggestion put forward within a number of these 
documents that, in order to address problems with political participation, it is young 
people who have to change, rather than institutions: 
 
Despite the more complex social and economic context, young people are 
well-equipped to adapt. It is up to the national and European policy-makers to 
facilitate this process of change by making young people stakeholders in our 
societies. (2001: 4, italics added) 
 
Emphasis is thus placed on the importance of young people learning how to 
participate, rather than recognising the ways in which they are doing so already. The 
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Youth in Action programme, for example, has four priorities, one of which focuses on 
the ‘participation of young people’. This is itself comprised of three dimensions: to 
increase the participation by young people in the civic life of their community; to 
increase participation by young people in the system of representative democracy; and 
greater support for various forms of learning to participate (EC, 2006: 7; italics 
added). This resonates with broader debates within youth studies literature that have 
emphasised the construction of adolescence as a period of ‘always “becoming”, 
waiting for the future to arrive’ (Lesko, 2001: 111). Lesko argues that this tends to 
promote a passivity on the part of young people as they are told that it is only the 
future that matters. 
 
When we consider the way in which young femininity is understood across the range 
of documents, it is clear that a gender focus is notably absent (a point which has 
already been made above). Nevertheless, the construction of youth, more generally, 
has much in common with the ‘Reviving Ophelia’ discourse discussed previously, as 
the following extracts indicate: 
 
All this [the changing nature of youth including, for example, more protracted 
transitions to adulthood] is often reflected in a sense of fragility, a loss of 
confidence in the existing decision-making systems, and a degree of 
disaffection in terms of the traditional forms of participation. (CEC, 2001: 4) 
 
Young people have a sense of uncertainty and of the difficulties that they will 
encounter in their private and professional lives... an awareness of the fragility 
of their own situation. (CEC, 2001:14) 
 
This pessimistic view of contemporary youth articulates with the deficit model of 
political engagement outlined above to problematise both the outlook and actions of 
young men and women across Europe, paying little attention to the more positive 
accounts of participation emphasised within much of the academic literature and in 
the narratives of many young people themselves. 
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iii. Narrow conceptualisation of citizenship and political participation 
 
In their longitudinal study of young British people’s understandings of citizenship, 
Lister et al. (2005) argue that over  the period in which they collected data (from 1999 
until 2001) they witnessed a shift away from conceptualisations that emphasised the 
rights of citizens towards, what they term, ‘constructive social participation’. They 
contend that, in many ways, this mirrors the wider political discourse in the UK over 
the same period, which has prioritised responsibilities over rights, and emphasised the 
centrality of social cohesion and civic renewal to notions of citizenship. The five 
youth-related policy documents provide evidence of a similar discourse operating at 
the European level. Indeed, social cohesion is frequently emphasised and linked in a 
direct and explicit manner to understandings of citizenship and political participation. 
In the White Paper, for example, it is argued that by ‘throwing themselves into social 
activities’ in schools and other arenas, young people can ‘live citizenship to the full’ 
(2001: 5). Similarly, one of the four priority themes of the 2002 Resolution 
encourages:  
 
...young people’s participation in the exercise of active citizenship and civil 
society. This means supporting the work of youth associations and other forms 
of active participation in order to improve young people’s participation and 
social cohesion. 
 
Moreover, as part of this wider discourse of citizenship as ‘constructive social 
engagement’, particular emphasis is placed on voluntary work.  This is argued to be 
an important means of fostering active citizenship and political participation amongst 
young people. A second theme of the 2002 Resolution is to promote voluntary 
activities among young people. This involves ‘making it easier for young people to 
find voluntary work so as to develop their sense of responsibility and citizenship and 
their active participation in society.’ This emphasis on belonging, conformity and 
duty to others, in contrast to more radical understandings of citizenship, is evident in 
the conceptualisation of volunteering as a form of service, here outlined clearly in the 
White Paper: 
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Voluntary service is a form of social participation...and a factor in 
employability and integration....efforts should be made in years to come to 
develop voluntary service significantly at national, regional and local levels. 
(2001: 17) 
 
While volunteering can often further social cohesion and encourage young people to 
participate more fully in their communities, it does tend to entrench a particular 
understanding of political engagement that may not articulate well with the new forms 
of participation outlined in the first part of this paper. Indeed, Garmanikow and Green 
(2000) have argued that an emphasis on active citizenship, volunteering and 
community involvement may well undermine a more rights-based understanding of 
citizenship.  Thus, in their emphasis on social cohesion, these policies give relatively 
little recognition to the more oppositional forms of political engagement which have 
been documented within the academic literature. Where such forms are recognised, 
they are generally problematised. For example, the White Paper notes that:  ‘Some 
young people have taken refuge in indifference or individualism, while others have 
tried forms of expression which may have been excessive or even on the margins of 
democratic means’ (2001: 4).  
 
Alongside this privileging of ‘constructive social engagement’ within EU policies, 
young people’s commitment to the European project often seems to be 
misrepresented. For example, despite evidence of some young people’s antipathy to a 
European identity cited above, the White Paper claims that:   
 
Mindful that decisions are increasingly being taken at European level, young 
people want to become involved in Europe. They want a new European youth 
initiative and greater co-ordination of national youth policies.... (2001: 55) 
 
Moreover, all five documents tend to overlook the high level of contestation about the 
nature of ‘European citizenship’, treating it as a largely unproblematic term. The 
Youth in Action programme, for example, ‘aims to inspire a sense of European 
citizenship among the youth of Europe’ on the basis that is something they are 
currently lacking.  
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iv. Worker-as-citizen 
 
A long-standing critique of EU policy is its promotion of a narrow and economically-
driven understanding of citizenship. Indeed, Weller (2007) argues that, as a result of 
this focus, EU conceptualisations of citizenship and political participation have tended 
to exclude young people under the age of eighteen – as the dominant Western 
understandings of childhood deny children access to full-time work. It is unfair to 
claim that the various youth documents discussed here are focussed solely (or even 
mainly) on the economic: social cohesion and political identity, for example, are both 
important and structuring themes. Nevertheless, it is notable that the social integration 
of young people appears to be understood largely in relation to the labour market, 
rather than civil or political society. The White Paper, for example, argues that 
‘employment is a prerequisite for social inclusion’, going on to contend that ‘to have a 
job means adult status, self-respect, money, independence...’ (2001: 38).  This theme 
within the five youth documents has much in common with the findings of the UK 
study conducted by Lister and colleagues (2005), discussed above. They found that, 
over the course of their research, increasing numbers of young people came to 
understand citizenship as ‘respectable economic independence’.  This, they argue, is 
inextricably bound up with wider political discourses about citizenship and political 
participation and, in particular, the centrality of paid work to New Labour’s concept 
of the socially and politically integrated citizen (see also Levitas, 2000). 
 
It is also notable that while individualism and autonomy are welcomed in relation to 
employment within the EU policies (there is, for example, considerable space within 
the White Paper devoted to methods of promoting entrepreneurship amongst young 
people), they are problematised with respect to political participation. Indeed, instead 
of welcoming some of the new and more individually-oriented forms of political 
engagement discussed above, the White Paper laments that some young people have 
eschewed collective action and are instead seeking ‘refuge in indifference or 
individualism’ (2001:4). Moreover, individual forms of participation seem to be 
considered of lesser value when compared to more traditional methods of 
engagement. 
 
20 
 
v. Emphasis on existing structures and forms, rather than new forms of participation 
 
The discussion of individualized forms of political participation is not, however, 
always consistent. Indeed, the White Paper and the other policy documents do, in 
places, engage with the individualized, ‘self-actualising’ citizen outlined by Bennett 
(2007) and others. For example, it is recognised that some young people may wish to 
participate ‘on a more individual and more one-off basis, outside of the old 
participatory structures and mechanisms’, and that ‘it is up to the public authorities to 
bridge the gap between young people’s eagerness to express their opinions and the 
methods and structures which society offers’ (2001: 10). Nevertheless, frequently this 
interpretation is sidelined in favour of measures to develop ‘dutiful citizens’ (Bennett, 
2007) who participate in more conventional ways, through more traditional channels 
such as youth councils, which are strongly promoted in several of the policy 
documents. The White Paper, for example, argues that ‘The majority [of young 
people]...want to influence policies, but have not found the appropriate way of doing 
so’ (2001: 4), while the 2002 Resolution contends that furthering young people’s 
participation requires ‘supporting the work of youth associations and other forms of 
active participation in order to improve young people’s participation..’ (italics added). 
Thus, within this analysis, new methods of participation are clearly problematised. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The discussion above has explored the various ways in which the political 
participation and citizenship of young people has been understood within recent EU 
policy documents. It has highlighted a number of ways in which policy discourses 
articulate with Loader’s more optimistic ‘cultural displacement’ perspective and make 
passing reference to the emergence of what Bennett has termed the ‘actualizing 
citizen’ of contemporary society. Nevertheless, as a result of their tendency to 
problematise young people’s political engagement and construct them as citizens-in-
the-making, in need of educational programmes and socialisation into more traditional 
forms of participation, it is the ‘disaffected citizen’ discourse that is privileged. 
Moreover, as a result of the emphasis on the responsibilities of young people rather 
than their rights, the policy documents tend to reinforce a narrow definition of 
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citizenship, and give little recognition to the more oppositional ways in which some 
young people are choosing to engage with local, national, regional and global politics. 
These patterns are, of course, not unique to the EU. Indeed, within the UK various 
writers have pointed to the tensions within citizenship education programmes which, 
on one hand purport to encourage an active citizenship committed to, for example, 
changing unjust laws and, on the other, put forward a controlling agenda, aiming to 
socialise young people into particular social norms (Coffey, 2004; Cunningham and 
Lavalette, 2004). 
 
The analysis above has also suggested that gender is notably absent from all five 
policy documents.  As such, they fail to recognise differences by gender in the ways 
in which young people are engaging with the political, and also the continuing impact 
of gender on the life experiences of young men and women across Europe. Perhaps 
most significantly, the gender-blind ‘disaffected citizen’ which is privileged in these 
accounts fails to engage with the creative ways in which young women are attempting 
to forge a new type of politics, and claiming new spaces in which to affirm a political 
identity.  
 
Annex 1: Details about documents analysed 
Text Authors 
 
Status Structure/content 
A New Impetus for 
European Youth (CEC, 
2001) 
 
European Commission White Paper - contains an 
official set of proposals in the 
area of youth policy, to be 
used as a vehicle for their 
development. Addressed to 
EU Member States. 
 
Comprised of the following 
sections: Background; 
Challenges; Consultation 
Exercise; A New Ambition; 
Conclusion. 
Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers (2002) 
 
Council of Ministers Official adoption of the 
White Paper ‘A New Impetus 
for European Youth’ by 
representatives of the 
governments of the Member 
States. Addressed to EU 
Member States. 
 
Set priorities and timetable for 
EU’s work until 2004 in the 
field of ‘youth’. Includes the 
following: co-operation based 
on the Open Method of Co-
ordination; taking greater 
account of ‘youth’ dimension 
in other policies; updated 
framework for co-operation; 
promoting active citizenship 
among young people 
  
Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers (2005) 
 
Council of Ministers Official updating of the 2002 
Resolution by representatives 
of the governments of the 
Member States. Addressed to 
EU Member States. 
 
Updated 2002 Resolution. 
European Youth Pact (2005) 
 
European Council 
 
Annex of Presidency 
Conclusions of the European 
Council. Integrated part of 
the Lisbon Strategy. 
Addressed to EU Member 
States. 
Calls on EU and Members 
States to take action in the 
following areas: employment, 
integration and social 
advancement; education, 
training and mobility; 
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 reconciliation of working life 
and family life. 
 
Youth in Action Programme 
(2006) 
 
European Commission Puts into effect the legal 
framework to support non-
formal learning activities for 
young people. Contributes to 
fulfilment of aims set out in 
the Lisbon Strategy and the 
European Youth Pact, 
amongst others. 
Addressed to EU Member 
States. 
Comprised of 5 distinct 
‘Actions’: Action 1 – Youth 
for Europe; Action 2 – 
European Voluntary Service; 
Action 3 – Youth in the World; 
Action 4 – Youth Support 
Systems; Action 5 – Support 
for European C-operation in 
the Youth Field. 
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i
 The OMC ‘allows member states to co-operate through sharing best practice on participation by 
young people, information for young people, voluntary activities and a greater knowledge of the field 
of youth, while respecting the areas of responsibility set out in the Treaties’ (Resolution 2002). It is 
argued that subsidiarity is compatible with enhanced co-operation at European level, and that 
encouraging countries to work together in this way is likely to enhance the impact and coherence of 
national policies. 
 
